Reviewed by Cathy Urwin he republication and publication, respectively, of these two, historically important and beautifully written books creates the opportu-T nity to reflect on the contribution of the movement for Child Study which flourished in Europe and the United States from the end of the nineteenth century. This movement had far reaching effects in health, education and social policy. It also contributed to the climate of curiosity and innovation that made psychoanalysis possibIe, and paved the way for the psychoanalytic observation of babies and young children.
Reviews gation of individual cases over survey studies, with the idea that ultimately careful observation would provide a practical link between scientific enquiry and the classroom. Although the two organisations were combined in 1907, in the British context Sully remained a leading spirit.
Sully's own introduction to this book clearly explains his aims and his rationale for his methodology. It also reveals assumptions no longer acceptable to the contemporary reader. As Sugarman points out, the book is somewhat coloured by an idealised view of childhood innocence associated with Rousseau and revitalised in the Romantic literature of Wordsworth, Blake, Dickens, Hugo, Kipling and others. Though Sully does not shrink from mentioning childhood unhappiness and the effects of poverty and abuse, his view is nevertheless that the 'very instinct of childhood is to be glad in its self-created world . . . untroubled with the future, knowing nothing of the misery of disillusion' (p3). Furthermore Sully seeks to draw a contrast between this 'poetic' view of childhood and a newer view which sees the child as an object of 'scientific' as well as 'sentimental' interest. This view is largely propelled by the new interest in infancy. The theory of evolution gave a particular impetus to this view. In addition to providing a naturalist's methodology, Darwin's thesis that we have evolved as a species from simpler forms raised questions about whether babies and young children would more closely resemble animal forebears than do adults. This gave rise to the 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny' thesis, or the idea that embryos and the young of a species go through stages of their species' evolutionary history. This idea has now been disproved empirically, but it was seriously explored in the nineteenth century, being extended into the new anthropological studies burgeoning at that time. This led to a general working assumption that the so-called 'savage' or 'primitive' was closer to nature and to animal forebears than was so-called civilised man.
Darwin did not share this view and eventually sort to distance himself from it and from the Social Darwinism that tended to go along with it. However, the recapitulation thesis runs through Sully's work as an organising thread. This leads to such contentious comments as, 'we all know (that) the lowest races of mankind stand in close proximity to the animal world. The same is true of the infants of civilised races' (p5).
There are also problems with Sully's view of women as less likely to be adequate to the task of observing infants, because their emotional natures are liable to make them insufficiently objective and impartial (sic). Sully's assumptions illustrate a pervasive split between poetic and scientific, emotion and reason which was distributed between men and women at the turn of the twentieth century. Arguably, a similar split Volume 5 No.1 + differentiated the infant and young child from the mature of the species, and the so-called primitive savage from the rest of humanity. It is chilling to recognise how much of the initial research in anthropology and in development was influenced by these kinds of ideas, which inevitably informed some of the literature that subsequently fascinated Freud.
On the other hand, what redeems Sully's work is the sheer quality of the observations and sensitivity of discussion, and the fact that the practice of his methods seems to go against much of the surrounding rationalistic dogma. For example, Sully describes in a moving way how not everyone can be an observer of infants or small children in that it depends on remaining in touch and being in sympathy with a child part of oneself. He also stresses that context is particularly important, that an account of behaviour on its own is meaningless, that differences between individuals are large and that everything hangs on being able to provide an appropriate interpretation.
Secondly, while apparently stressing infants' place in the animal kingdom, in fact Sully's account is overwhelmingly concerned with what makes human babies distinctly different, the origins of consciousness and what Sully calls 'the play of mind'. To illuminate this he must describe both behaviour and the inner life of the child.
Sully's organisation and interpretation of material is partly governed by the introspectionist tradition in British psychology. This aimed to describe consciousness with reference to states of feeling, knowing, willing and so forth. The topics covered include the imagination and the development of reason, the nature of children's thought, the development of language, and the nature of fear. The latter includes the irrational fears of childhood, superstition and the reasons for it. There are two chapters concerned with moral development, and two on children's drawing and aesthetic appreciation. Sully also includes extracts from A Father's Diary, Previously published anonymously, this is now thought to be from Sully's diary of his own son Clifford, begun in 1880. An analysis of the woman novelist George Sands' autobiographical account of her own childhood completes the work.
Throughout there are two broad themes. The first is the primacy of the imaginative life which remains a driving force behind more sophisticated forms of thinking emerging later on. Extending an idea associated with the social philosopher, Herbert Spencer, the second is that human dependency has produced an instinct for attachment that fosters sensitivity to vulnerability in others. Sully saw this as the source of a simple moral development which precedes the imposition of social norms.
Reviews
Thus, in Chapter IV 'Products of Child Thought', Sully describes how children's first attempts at imposing a system on the world have a mythological quality, illustrated by the child who describes the sun and moon as 'The mother and baby in the sky'. He argues for some general underlying principles, such as giving life to things that move, like running water, or reversing things according to self-interest, as, for example, the child who asserts 'When I am big and you are small, I'll carry you and put you to bed!'
Chapter V 'The Little Linguist', on language development, is one of the most amusing chapters. Examples of children inventing words or using them in novel ways highlight the degree to which language develops as a creative process rather than through a passive acquisition of a ready made system. For example, one child invented the word 'eyecurtain' for eyelid when he did not know the right term. Another coined the word 'sorrified' to express the emotional intensity of 'being sorry', after the manner of 'horrified'. Similarly, children may have difficulty grasping the meanings adults intend. For example, seeing a notice that he was told read 'Children Half Price', one child suggested to his mother that we should get a baby now while they are going cheap!'
Freud knew of Sully's work. One of his references to it, in a footnote to the essay on infantile sexuality in the Three Essays on Sexuality, published in 1905, points to a lack of attention to children's ideas about where babies come from. In fact, though Sully did not see infantile sexuality as a driving force, there are a number of examples identifying children's interest in these matters. It is also interesting how much attention Sully gave to children's understanding of emotional states. In Chapter VI 'Subject to Fear', Sully asserts, before Freud's use of the term, that 'repressions' do not apply to children of three years and under, although the 'expression of feelings is apt to get checked at an early date' (~1 9 2 ) .
On fear, Sully is interestingly psychological. He argues that fear cannot be explained on associationist learning principles, nor on the idea that, on the basis of animal inheritance, it exists to preserve us from danger; fear is too irrational for this. Most fears in humans presuppose a degree of intelligence. He gives considerable space to Preyer's account of his child who, at 6-7 months, developed a fear of strangers, arguing that this depended on the development of the 'human attachments' that preceded it.
On children's morality and understanding of rules and the law (Chapters VII and VIII), Sully sees the full gamut of emotions, including anger, envy and cruelty. Yet Sully's observations are sensitive and acute. There are poignant illustrations of temper tantrums. Sully recog-
nises the intense suffering in some of these outbursts, as the child recognises that he or she is in opposition with another will.
Though not yet moral, there is a reflective element here which, along with a respect for custom, contributes to the child's sense of fairness, justice and the value of rules. As to young children's callousness, Sully stresses children's curiosity rather than their pleasure in cruelty, as in the case of the four year old who asks, 'Is it rude to look at dead pigeons? . . . I want to see where the blood is'.
On children's lies, Sully argues against these as indicating moral depravity. The strong conscience that troubles most children indicates a respect for truth that emerges in normal circumstances. From an educational point of view Sully opposes the tight imposition of rules too early, arguing that for the young child rebellion is healthy as it is an expression of resistance against interference of the will by the will of another. In fact, once grasped, the idea of moral discipline will be extended extremely freely by some children, witness the harsh discipline they impose on their toys. This observation was of course several years before psychoanalysts stressed the dangers of a too severe superego.
The idea of a 'natural' affinity between developmental tendencies and teachers' goals in inculcating morality sits uneasily in the context of 'civilisation' being the site of higher development, to which humanity might still aspire, and the so-called 'savage' being closer to nature. Anthropological material is used more usefully in chapters on children's drawings. Sully likens the pleasure children get from bright colours, adornments and rhythms of sound and the body to the material being described or displayed by the nineteenth century anthropologists. He suggests that aesthetic experience and the activity of the imagination are primary and fundamental modalities for experiencing the world, contributing to a tendency in both children and non-European peoples to identi9 their representations of reality as the real thing. Applying this line of argument in discussing functions of children's art, Sully stresses how the use of art for communication has antedated its use in giving a literal depiction of external reality. Sully pinpoints how early drawings are intended to be symbols of particular objects or people rather than copies of reality. As in all areas, the child's own self-awareness contributes to bringing drawing in line with social expectation and convention. But again, Sully points out that children want to depict what is pleasing to them, such that they attempt to match an internal image conjured through aesthetic appreciation.
The importance of self-consciousness, and of having a will, comes out particularly strongly in Extractsfrorn a Father's Diary. The presentation Reviews follows many of the themes developed in the preceding chapters. Sully describes what aspects of the environment captured the tiny baby's interest, and the point at which, through 'an act of the imagination' he anticipated grasping a bottle when he saw it. Sully describes the first smile, displays of anger and fellow feeling; at six and a half months Clifford stared at his father when the latter pretended to cry. By now he shows fear of strangers and dislike of changes, though enjoys peek-aboo and his sister's antics.
In the second year, through the development of language and mobility, the baby as agent comes into his own. In addition to stressing the importance of the development of the will, Sully also emphasises the toddler's sociability and the impulse to communicate his or her experience of the world to other people. This social impulse to communicate about the mystery of the world would be encompassed in the beginnings of what developmental psychologists would now call 'a theory of mind'. Sugarman points out in her introduction that what makes Sully's work intellectually fascinating as well as, at times, irresistibly charming, is his emphasis on trying to capture what is specific to the child's way of perceiving, thinking and experiencing things. This is in contrast with developmental approaches that see young children as subjects for testing theories about general processes. There is an openness to being affected by the material, unbiased by theoretical presupposition, which is in the spirit of psychoanalytic observation. One might ask therefore, how does Sully emerge as an infant observer?
Sully aims, in part, to maintain an objective stance, looking in from the outside like a nineteenth century anthropologist visiting another land, or a naturalist observing an alien species. However, this stance is only partly successful. On the one hand, as Sully points out himself, his observation has been selective. Here he has aimed particularly to highlight what is most childlike about being a child. Moreover, his struggle to maintain impartiality and objectivity is self-confessedly contrived. Sully employs the device of describing the little boy's behaviour, then juxtaposing this description with an account of what was going on for the parent, his feelings and thoughts. This poor parent often failed to remain objectively uninvolved. We now know that this parent was, of course, Sully himself.
Some of the tongue-in-cheek humour and ingenuity involved in this is indicated in the following example, when, at twenty three months and ten days, the child's growth of language allowed him to carry on a conversation, 'a day marked in red letters for the proud and happy
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(Clifford) made a great deal of noise running about and shouting in his bedroom, His mother came in and rebuked him in the usual form ('Naughty! Naughty!'). He thereupon replied, 'Tit make noi' (sister makes noise). Mother (seriously): 'sister is at school.' (Clifford) with a still bolder look: 'Mamma make noi'.' Mother, with a convulsive effort to suppress laughing, still more emphatically: 'No, Mamma was in the other room.' (Clifford, looking archly at his doll, known as May): 'May make noi'. This sally was followed by a good deal of boyish laughter.
The observation continues:
The father evidently feels that this incident is highly suggestive of a lack of moral sense. So he thinks it well to add to the observation that the child had all the normal moral sensibility (~4 3 1 ) .
Unwittingly Sully discovered and highlighted through this literary device what we now recognise as a crucial aspect of infant observation, the emotional impact of the child's behaviour on the observer. It turns out that Charles Darwin himself made similar discoveries. Examining Darwin's ideas in historical context, Annie's Box foregrounds Darwin's experience as a parent. Annie was the second of the ten children born to Charles Darwin and Emma Wedgwood. This much loved child died in 1851 at ten years after a wasting illness, now thought to have been tuberculosis. 'Annie's box' was a box containing her writing things and various trinkets. Following her death, her mother sorted the box and packed it away along with other memorabilia. It was rediscovered by Randal Keynes, a great great grandson of Charles Darwin. He also discovered that Darwin kept a record of this child's illness during her last months. Darwin was intensely involved with Annie, as with the other children in the family. After his marriage in 1839, Darwin worked at home. He had already completed the voyage with the Beagle as ship's naturalist in 1831, when many of his key ideas about evolution were forged. One of Keynes' aims in this book is to demonstrate how Darwin's scientific ideas and what he was grappling with in his personal and domestic life were 'all of a piece' at a time when 'science meant knowledge and understanding in the broadest view' (pl). Secondly, he periods of depression and weariness notwithstanding. There are also some of the first infant observations, of their firstborn, William ('Doddy'), which were eventually used in 'A Biographical Sketch of an Infant', mentioned previously. Like Sully, Darwin tried to maintain analytic detachment and was always 'anxious to observe accurately the expression of a crymg child,' but found often that his sympathy with the grief spoiled the observation (p55). He was especially interested in the development of the senses and the emotions, and performed many of the quasi-experiments that he had recently performed on Jenny, the Orangutan newly acquired by London Zoo. Would William, like Jenny, respond to himself in the mirror? Like Sully, Darwin was interested in the beginnings of aesthetic appreciation. Did William, like Jenny, enjoy a mouth organ playng?
Darwin was also interested in when children had ideas about right and wrong. When William was just over a year old:
I repeated several times in a reproving voice 'Doddy won't give Papa a kiss, -naughty Doddy'. He unquestionably was made slightly uncomfortable by this -showing something like first moral sense (p56).
Of particular interest was the observation of jealousy, 'plainly exhibited when I fondled a large doll, and when I weighed his infant sister, he
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Keynes interweaves an account of the domestic and personal with a clear exegesis of Darwin's scientific work. He also explores why Darwin took so long to publish The Origin of Species. Indeed, as Keynes suggests, Darwin probably only finally published the account, in 1859, because otherwise Alfred Wallace, a young naturalist who was coming to similar views simultaneously, would have overtaken him.
Of factors contributing to the delay, one was Darwin's ill health, which left him emotionally exhausted and physically weak. This illness probably contained components of depression and anxiety. One source of anxiety was anticipating how his work would be received by the scientific community, and how it might offend or challenge the religious scruples of contemporary society.
Like Sully's, Darwin's questions about human nature were informed by philosophical discussion and argument. He was particularly taken by David Hume's examination of the nature of and need for religion, and on conditions necessary for the acceptance of scientific truth. But for Darwin the question of religious certainty was more personal. It is now well known that religious doubt was an issue for Charles when he first married Emma. Specifically, he doubted the existence of an after life, a source of great pain to Emma. Gaining dreadful poignancy with the death of Annie, the issue was debated freely between the two of them throughout their marriage and both would read newly published books by free thinkers of the day.
Keynes account of the drawn-out illness, of Annie's rallying, apparent recovery and eventual death is as moving and harrowing as the account of the parents' grief and mourning afterwards. Historical records, in notes and letters, make it clear that the fact that death of children was more common in those days made it no less painful. Keynes includes letters of other parents, friends or relatives of the Darwins, who also lost children later on, and who wrote to Charles and Emma of their grief. Despite their letters of comfort to these other parents, it is clear that Charles and Emma did not get over the death of Annie.
Darwin's records do not appear to give a definite explanation or theory of the cause of Annie's death. From the symptoms and the course of the illness, Keynes concludes that it was probably tuberculosis or consumption. There were of course contemporary treatments and theories of causation. One of these hinged on the idea that there was a consumptive 'type'. In the absence of a full understanding of mecha-Reviews nisms of transmission, common observation might suggest that vulnerability could occur in families. Annie was prescribed the same treatment as her father. This included regular dousings in the waters of Malvern.
I think that Darwin could not have escaped the question, was Annie's illness anything to do with him?
Whether or not these questions went through Darwin's mind, Darwin's work on evolution raised issues about mechanisms of inheritance which, although not answerable until the development of modem genetics, nevertheless raised new issues of responsibility about what is transmitted from one generation to the next. In considering Darwin's reluctance to publish, I was struck by the fact that, far from replacing the account of Genesis and the Garden of Eden, Darwin's work itself epitomises the problem of knowledge which the biblical account so clearly illustrates. Once discovered, the process of evolution and intergenerational connectedness brings as many sources of power, responsibility, fulfilment and guilt as the discovery of sexual passion itself.
It proposed that parental and filial affection lie at the base of the social instincts. He gave a key role to humans' capacity to empathise with the distress of others, an emphasis fine-tuned by his experience of loss and suffering as a parent. He was also apparently particularly indebted to George Eliot, whose early work include short stories illustrating the idea that the capacity to sympathise with both the suffering and the joy of others was a yardstick by which we could measure moral progress.
Eventually Darwin also used the concept of sympathy to challenge the growing popularity of Malthus's idea that the principle of 'the survival of the fittest' could be linked to his view of social progress as being driven by perpetual competition. The implication drawn from this was that those struggling were 'unfit' to survive in the struggle of life and should be let be. Darwin argued strongly that, far from this attitude being the natural response, the instinct for sympathy implied a compulsion to offer help to those in need, such that it was hard to suffer the emotional consequences of denying the impulse without extensive rationalisation or denial. Yet on matters of society and the possible social implications of the
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For example in his initial enthusiasm for the paper given by Wallace in 1864, mentioned previously, Darwin supported the view that, in the development of human societies the capacity for co-operation and sympathy had led individuals to help each other to the benefit of the community, a process which had been favoured by natural selection.
Wallace took this further to argue that there would come a time when, as mental and moral faculties became better developed, mankind would cease to be affected by natural selection, as the species could use its abilities to guard against discomfort and adverse circumstances. Wallace argued that, if his conclusions were right, it must inevitably follow that 'higher' communities, 'the more intellectual and moral', must displace the lower and more degraded ones (p239). These ideals carry strong implications about better or fitter societies. Wallace did not go on to develop this line of thought, and Darwin's own treatise on the topic, The Descent of Man, focused more on history than on future development. Nevertheless the same ethnocentrism that was present in Sully's work is inescapable. That these two important figures of the nineteenth century shared ways of thinking is unsurprising. Both were influenced by the social questions of the period, and by a philosophical stance which sought understanding by creating a position of the 'Other', whether that of the female, the infant or the savage, through which the nature of humanity could be refracted. Within these limitations, however, these are clearly men of great compassion. They knew each other well and, despite differences in age, one gets the feeling that they would have liked each other. Just as Sully is at his strongest in pointing to the unusual, the irrational, the unexpected in the child's mind, Darwin's strength is his insistence on rooting us in nature. Thus, despite arguing that morality was rooted in human affection and sympathy, in The Descent of Man he insisted on the ruthfulness of natural selection as a non-teleological force, and on the imperfect compilation that was the result. Extending this to morality, and comparing us to insects, he was thus able to point out: 'If , , , men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker bees, think it their sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no-one would think of interfering' (~2 6 6 ) . With shades of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, and the genocide to come in the next century, as Keynes points out, and contradicting the received morality of the day as it did, the sharpness of this paragraph is breathtaking.
